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THE SPIRIT OF BROWN IN PARENTS
INVOLVED AND BEYOND
SHARON L. BROWNE± & Elizabeth A. Yit
"[T]he purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to ensure that peo-
ple are treated as individuals rather than based on the color of their
skin."
-Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.t
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 11 immediately prompted a legal
and social debate on whether this decision is consistent with the Court's
landmark 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education.2 Legal schol-
ars continue to duel on the meaning of realizing and preserving the
"Spirit of Brown" in today's increasingly racially diverse society. In the
days after the decision was issued, the nation's op-ed columns were
flooded with features from both sides, such as: A Blow to Brown; The
Supreme Court Enables the Resegregation of Schools by Race;3 Brown's
Legacy Lives, but Barely;4 Resegregation Now;' Don't Mourn Brown v.
± Sharon L. Browne is a Principal Attorney in Pacific Legal Foundation's Individual Rights
Practice Group, where she specializes in civil rights litigation. She was actively involved in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District and Meredith v. Jefferson
County, Kentucky Board of Education as an amicus and sat second chair during oral argument
before the United States Supreme Court in Meredith. She was named California Lawyer of the
Year in 2004 for her achievements in defending and implementing Proposition 209, the California
Civil Rights Initiative, which outlawed race- and sex- based discrimination and preferences in
public contracting, public employment, and public education.
t Elizabeth A. Yi was a 2007-2008 College of Public Interest Law Fellow at Pacific Legal
Foundation, Sacramento, CA. She received her J.D. from U.C. Hastings College of Law in 2007,
and a B.A. from Occidental College in 2003.
T Transcript of Oral Argument at 47-48, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908).
1. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007), rev'g 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Editorial, A Blow to Brown; The Supreme Court Enables the Resegregation of Schools by
Race, WASH. POST, June 29, 2007 at A20.
4. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Op-Ed., Brown's Legacy Lives, but Barely, BOSTON GLOBE, June
29, 2007, at At7.
5. Editorial, Resegregation Now, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A28.
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Board of Education; 6 The Court Returns to Brown. 7
This heated debate is evident in the decision itself, wherein an emo-
tionally divided Court attempted to resolve weighty issues regarding the
role of race in the nation's public elementary and secondary schools.
Parents Involved and its companion case, McFarland ex. rel. McFarland
v. Jefferson County Public Schools,8 presented the ideal vehicle for pro-
ponents on both sides of the debate over the constitutionality of the use
of race in student assignment plans in elementary and secondary9 public
schools.
The school districts in both Seattle, Washington, and Louisville,
Kentucky, used race as a factor in determining whether a student could
attend the school of his or her choice.1l In Seattle, students were classi-
fied as being either "nonwhite" or "white."'" In Louisville, the corre-
sponding classifications were "black" or "other."' 2  The shared
underlying motive for these "voluntary integration"' 3 plans was to
increase racial and ethnic diversity in the public schools.' 4 The key
debates in the Court rested first on whether voluntary integration pro-
grams were subject to strict scrutiny, and then on whether race could be
used as a factor at all for determining student assignments to public
schools.
One side, led by Chief Justice Roberts writing for the plurality of
the Court, declared emphatically that Brown compels public elementary
and secondary schools to stop using race altogether in their assignment
programs, even for the purpose of racially integrating the schools. 5 The
dissent, led by Justice Breyer, countered that Brown's legacy calls for
6. Juan Williams, Op-Ed., Don't Mourn Brown v. Board of Education, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2007, at A29.
7. George F. Will, Editorial, The Court Returns to Brown, WASH. POST, July 5, 2007, at
A17.
8. 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
9. The terms "primary and secondary," "elementary and secondary," and "K-12" will be
used interchangeably to indicate grade levels from kindergarten through twelfth grade.
10. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2747-50
(2007).
11. Id. at 2746.
12. Id.
13. The term "voluntary integration," as used widely by the legal literature on this topic,
indicates general efforts by school districts, based on their own policy rationales, to intermingle
the races in their schools so as to avoid racially isolated schools within the districts. The term
"affirmative action" encompasses a broader array of race-conscious programs in public
contracting, employment, and in all levels of education.
14. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755.
15. Id. at 2768 ("[T]he way 'to achieve a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a nonracial basis,' is to stop assigning students on a racial basis." (quoting Brown v.
Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01(1955)) (internal citation omitted).
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racial diversity and integration in public education at all levels, and that
local school officials should be entrusted to carry out this process. 16 As
the swing vote, Justice Kennedy agreed with the Chief Justice to the
extent that the districts' plans failed to survive strict scrutiny because of
the individualized discriminatory nature of the plans, 7 but maintained
that local school officials may still engage in generalized race-conscious
decisions to integrate students through narrowly-tailored means. 18 Con-
sequently, "[flifty-three years after Brown, [Parents Involved] forces
another public discussion about the proper role of race-conscious deci-
sionmaking in America's public schools. . . . [A] heated debate still
exists over the meaning of just a handful of words ... in Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 19
This Article argues that Parents Involved reaffirmed Brown's spirit
of racial neutrality and paves the way to realizing Brown's legacy of
eliminating state-imposed racial line-drawing. PART II provides a brief
historical context behind the Court's landmark Brown decision. Building
on its historical heritage, PART III shows that the spirit and purpose of
Brown was to achieve racial neutrality in government decisionmaking,
not racial integration per se. PART IV considers the impact of Parents
Involved in carrying out Brown's legacy in elementary and secondary
public schools. In particular, there is no "benign-use" exception to racial
neutrality, and any race-neutral measures employed by school districts
remain subject to judicial presumptions favoring equality. The most
enduring legacy of Brown is that school districts must not group children
into racial categories, especially as racial lines are becoming increas-
ingly blurred by today's social and geographic mobility.
II. BROWN's Historical Heritage
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the "heritage" of Brown
compels government officials to abide by the principle of color-blind-
ness-that laws may not classify our citizens according to race.20 As the
Chief Justice recognized, Brown stood for equality, not because it guar-
anteed African Americans and other minorities access to certain privi-
leges based on their racial minority status, but because it forbade the
16. Id. at 2800 ("[The districts'] plans represent local efforts to bring about the kind of
racially integrated education that Brown v. Board of Education long ago promised-efforts that this
Court has repeatedly required, permitted, and encouraged local authorities to undertake." (citing
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Breyer, J., dissenting))).
17. Id. at 2792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
18. Id.
19. Comment, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1;
Voluntary Racial Integration in Public Schools, 121 HARV. L. REv. 98, 103 (2007).
20. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767.
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states from treating any individuals or groups differently based solely on
their race. Critics of Parents Involved argue that Brown stood for egali-
tarian ideals requiring the state to actively integrate blacks into Ameri-
can society, and specifically for the goal of racially integrating the
nation's public schools.2 But in fact, Brown embodies the same ideals
that were proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, of individual
civil rights and liberties free from government infringement. Brown's
spirit is the American dream of equality in the eyes of government.
A. America's Promise of Equality
The American guarantee of individual rights is grounded on equal-
ity, with the Declaration of Independence as its ultimate expression.22
As the precursor to the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence
described the individual's rights as "unalienable," including "life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness."23 These rights are based upon the
"self-evident" principle that "all men are created equal"24 in the eyes of
the law. Although simply stated, these principles of equality proved dif-
ficult to realize, especially as America was plagued by the "original sin"
of slavery from its founding.25
Two events in American history stand out as pivotal points toward
the preservation of the Declaration's "unalienable rights" for each citi-
zen.2 6 America's first century as a nation saw the abolitionist movement,
then in the second century, the fight for securing equal opportunity
regardless of race.27 Although presented with two distinctly different
tasks, the underlying goal of preserving civil rights for each American
remained a consistent theme during both movements.28 Equal-rights
advocates, from the nineteenth-century abolitionists to the twentieth-
century Civil Rights leaders, shared a common vision that each individ-
ual held certain civil rights and that the purpose of government is to
21. Bryant Smith, Far Enough Back Where We Started: Race Perception from Brown to
Meredith, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 297, 301 (2008) ("The spirit of Brown contains a promise to provide
every child with the opportunity to attend a satisfactory public school. A diversified educational
experience falls under the umbrella of 'satisfactory."'); James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and
Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REv. 131, 152 (2007) ("To detach the underlying goal-
school integration-from the arguments made in advance of that goal is to distort history.").
22. See CLIr BOLICK, THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FRAUD 26-27 (1996).
23. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
24. Id.
25. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTrrUTI oN: A BIOGRAPHY 20 (2005).
26. BOLICK, supra note 22, at 24.
27. Id.; see also Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court's Split Over Public School Integration:
Who Really Betrayed Brown's Legacy?, FINDLAW, July 2, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
dorf/ 20070702.html.
28. BOLICK, supra note 22, at 24.
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secure these rights through enforcement of a rule of law.29
The foundation of this shared vision was the constitutional frame-
work that guarantees limitations on the state's power to encroach upon
individual liberties.3° Although the state functions as the guarantor of
civil rights, the state has a "tremendous propensity for abuse"31 because
it enjoys a monopoly over the legal use of coercion and force. Therefore,
the "architects of civil rights were keen to stress . . . that government
possesses only those powers explicitly ceded to it by the people."32 The
principal mission of securing equality "has been to restrict the power of
government"33 to infringe on individual liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution.34
The American promise of equality had visionaries throughout the
nation's history who fought vigorously to realize its promise. As Profes-
sor Amar notes, "[d]uring the 1770s, soaring rhetoric of liberty and ear-
nest debate about the sources of legitimate [constitutional] authority
pulled many Americans toward abolition."35 Many pre-Union states out-
lawed slavery, and "systems of gradual emancipation began to
emerge,"36 although the Constitution itself simply failed to address the
problem of slavery.37 From the onset of the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln
29. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 36 (1994) (The abolitionist movement in the 1830s
was like a "crusade almost quasi-religious in its liturgy.... [Slavery] was plainly wrong because
it violated the most basic, inalienable, and self-evident right in the American credo-that of
personal liberty."); WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 67 (1984)
("Douglass's conceptualization of Reconstruction, like that of his black abolitionist and Radical
Republican cohorts, embraced full political, civil, and economic equality for the freedpeople.");
BOLICK, supra note 22, at 36-37 (Martin Luther King, Jr. "asked not for special treatment or
retribution, but only for the basic rights and opportunities that all Americans cherish. 'Our goal is
freedom,' he declared. 'I believe we will win it because the goal of the nation is freedom.' ").
30. See AMAR, supra note 25, at 10 ("No liberty was more central than the people's liberty to
govern themselves under rules of their own choice; and the Preamble [to the Constitution]
promised to secure this and other 'Blessings of Liberty' not just to the Founding generation, but
also, emphatically, to 'our Posterity."').
31. BOLICK, supra note 22, at 27.
32. Id.; see also AMAR, supra note 25, at I I (explaining that the Preamble was a clear
recognition of "popular rights," emphasizing which rights "'the people' 'retain' and 'reserve' and
may 'resume' and 'reassume'" as against the sovereign).
33. BOLICK, supra note 22, at 27.
34. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 98 (1992) ("The Civil War amendments [13th, 14th, and 15th
Amendments]--on slavery, citizenship, voting, equal protection, due process, and privileges and
immunities-were designed to decrease the scope of state power to confer ordinary common law
liberties selectively on some while denying them to others."); see also id. at 94 ("Under Jim Crow,
big government fell into the hands of the wrong people, who were able to perpetuate their
stranglehold over local communities and businesses by means of a pervasive combination of
public and private force.").
35. AMAR, supra note 25, at 20.
36. Id.
37. Despite the Declaration's glowing assertion of the principles of human equality, the
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made hig position against slavery very clear-"[i]f slavery is not wrong,
nothing is wrong."38
To be sure, the problem of the decades-old institution of slavery
could not be immediately resolved with the Union's victory in the Civil
War and the passage of the Civil War Amendments. In order realistically
to transition former slaves to freemen,39 Congress took active remedial
measures to integrate them into American society. The Freedmen's
Bureau, created in 1865, "was empowered to distribute clothing, food,
and fuel to destitute freedmen and overs[aw] 'all subjects' relating to
their condition in the South."4 While charging the Bureau with unprece-
dented responsibilities, Congress clearly saw these as a "temporary
expedient" with an initial life span of only one year.4 Although the
Freedmen's Bureau distributed benefits to newly freed black citizens,42
the Bureau's purpose was strictly remedial so that newly emancipated
freedmen might enjoy the right of all citizens "to have full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty... with-
out respect to race or color, or previous condition of slavery."43
The thirty-ninth Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
banning racial discrimination in public accommodations.' Leading up
to its enactment, proponents of the Act echoed the Constitution's funda-
mental guarantee of individual liberties. They declared that a "free gov-
ernment demands the abolition of all distinctions founded on color and
Constitutional Convention had largely managed to ignore the looming issue of slavery. See
KLUGER, supra note 29, at 34-35 ("In the fundamental conflict between human rights and
property rights that was implicit in the slave question, the men who cast the mold of basic national
policy did not hesitate to select the latter. They saw no choice-or would not, at any rate, admit to
any for fear of the consequences. And so they passed the conflict on to other generations.").
38. Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to A.G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864) (on file with the
Library of Congress); see also AMAR, supra note 25, at 352 n. 1 ("Though Lincoln penned these
words after 1858-in 1864, to be precise-he immediately added that 'I can not remember when I
did not so think, and feel.'").
39. ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 37 (1990) ("Black migrants who
hoped to find urban employment [after the Civil War] often encountered severe disappointment.");
id. at 67 ("[W]hite public opinion [in 1865 Mississippi] could not conceive of the negro having
any rights at all.").
40. Id. at 31.
41. Id.
42. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 397 (1978) (opinion of Marshall, J.)
("The Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment is the same Congress that passed the 1866
Freedmen's Bureau Act, an Act that provided many of its benefits only to Negroes.").
43. Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77 (1866).
44. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, §1, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875) ("[All] persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and
limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless
of any previous condition of servitude.").
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race." 45 Senator Sumner, a key abolitionist figure in Congress, and
strong proponent of the Civil Rights Act, emphasized that "[the law]
makes no discrimination on account of color."46
The Act was struck down in 1883 by the Supreme Court in the
Civil Rights Cases,4 7 but its goal of eliminating state-enforced racial dis-
tinctions was finally realized in Brown nearly eighty years after the
Act's initial enactment.48 Congress in 1875, like the early abolitionists,
already understood this ought to be the law of the land, declaring that
"[t]he time has come when all distinctions that grew out of slavery ought
to disappear."49
B. Brown Stems from America's Founding Principles of Equality
Brown flows directly from the nation's founding vision of individ-
ual equality. As a response to the states' pervasive infringement of indi-
vidual rights and liberties through Jim Crow legislation, Brown
repudiated the concept that the government could separate individuals
based on race as long as they were given "equal" facilities and benefits.
Even after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
declared no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws,"5 the Southern states enacted a
series of Jim Crow laws to segregate public facilities between black and
white individuals.5' In 1896, the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson52
held that states could exercise their "police power" to require racially
segregated public facilities when these facilities were found to be func-
45. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947, 1008 (1995) (quoting 2 CONG. REC. 4083 (May 20, 1874) (statement of Sen. Pratt)).
46. Id. at 1009 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (Jan. 15, 1872)).
47. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (The Court explained that the Act was
over-inclusive because it regulated both private racial discrimination and state-mandated
segregation. "[I]t is proper to state that civil rights, such as are guarantied [sic] by the constitution
against state aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by
state authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful
act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of
that individual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they affect his
person, his property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the state, or not done
under state authority, his rights remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort
to the laws of the state for redress.").
48. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. McConnell, supra note 45, at 1008 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3190,
3193 (May 8, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman)).
50. U.S. CoNsv. amend. XIV, §1.
51. EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 91-92.
52. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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tionally and tangibly equivalent.53 Applying this "separate but equal"
doctrine, the Court in Plessy upheld a Louisiana statute that required all
railway companies to provide equal but separate accommodations for
the "white and colored races."54 Infamously characterizing as an "under-
lying fallacy" the assumption that "the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority,"55 Plessy
embraced, and thus perpetuated, a broad measure of deference to state
legislatures' ability to regulate on the basis of race. 6 The Plessy Court
gave its imprimatur to legally enforced segregation. As a result, the Jim
Crow regime had a virtual carte blanche to impose both social and eco-
nomic barriers "to keep blacks segregated, politically powerless, and
economically servile. 57 The Deep South in the 1950s has even been
described as having "an uncanny resemblance to the legal Apartheid of
South Africa", as Jim Crow legislation disenfranchised blacks politically
and socially separated them from the public sphere. 8
The anti-segregation movement leading up to Brown was a series of
direct responses to states' ability to enact and enforce racial regulations
such as the Jim Crow laws. 59 The unifying mission of the civil rights
leaders at that time was simple-to stop states' ability to classify indi-
viduals on the basis of race. As Justice Harlan described in his lone
dissent in Plessy, "[iun respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the
Constitution of the United States does not, I think, permit any public
authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoy-
ment of such rights."6 He famously coined the saying that "[o]ur Con-
stitution is color-blind", as our Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens" and that "[tihe law regards man as man, and
takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights
as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved."'61 Although
Harlan was the sole dissenter in Plessy, the idea of the "colorblind con-
53. Id. at 544 (Justice Billings Brown writing for the majority opined that the Equal
Protection Clause was not intended to ensure "commingling of the two races.").
54. Id. at 540, 543.
55. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
56. EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 92 (Plessy's "blanket authorization of wide-scale state
regulation under the police power thus dictated" the segregationist agenda for the next seventy
years until Brown.).
57. BOLICK, supra note 22, at 32.
58. Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston III, A Re-Analysis of the Legal, Political, and
Social Landscape of Desegregation From Plessy v. Ferguson to Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2007 BYU EDuc. & L.J. 217, 220 (2007).
59. EPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 93 ("The response to Jim Crow was equally clear and
authoritative: any practice, public or private, that drew distinctions between whites and blacks in
social, economic, or political life fell outside the pale.").
60. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 559.
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stitution" was not new. As the Justice himself acknowledged, the same
ideas were advocated by the Reconstruction Congress following the
Civil War.62 He explains that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments "removed the race line from our governmental systems. 63
It would be another half century before Justice Harlan's "colorblind
constitution" view would prevail when the Supreme Court in Brown
struck down the "separate but equal" doctrine.' The Brown Court
acknowledged the invidious effect of separating individuals solely
because of their race.65 It recognized that the constitutional guarantee of
"equality under the law" is a declaration "that all persons, whether
colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States. 66 The
Court proclaimed that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal" and struck down the states' ability to draw racial lines, 67 recog-
nizing that "'[t]he impact [of segregation] is greater when it has the
sanction of the law."6 8 Although Brown applied specifically to the con-
text of public education, the Court embraced the inevitable broader soci-
etal implications of its decision by repudiating the Jim Crow laws in the
South, and its former holding in Plessy v. Ferguson.69 The Brown Court
had effectively struck down state-imposed segregation in all public facil-
ities with one sweeping stroke.
The Brown plaintiffs explicitly argued for a "colorblind" constitu-
tion. Robert L. Carter, as counsel for the plaintiffs, said during oral
argument,
no state can use race, and race alone, as a basis upon which to ground
any legislative, any lawful constitutional authority and, particularly
this Court has indicated in a number of opinions that this is so
because it is not felt that race is a reasonable basis upon which to
ground acts; it is not a real differentiation, and it is not relevant and,
in fact, this Court has indicated that race is arbitrary and an irrational
standard. 70
Thurgood Marshall, the other plaintiffs' counsel, contended that
62. Id. at 555.
63. Id.
64. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954).
65. Id. at 492-95.
66. Id. at 490 n.5 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880)).
67. Id. at 495.
68. Id. at 494.
69. Id. at 491-92 (The Court discusses the "separate but equal" doctrine generally, noting that
in none of its past "cases was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro
plaintiff."). The Court also relied on Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879),
which noted the Fourteenth Amendment was "primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be
made against [the colored race] by law because of their color."
70. BROWN V. BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 11,
15 (Leon Friedman ed., 2004).
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[t]he only thing that we ask for is that the state-imposed racial segre-
gation be taken off, and to leave the county school board, the county
people, the district people, to work out their own solution of the prob-
lem to assign children on any reasonable basis [other than race] they
want to assign them on.
7 1
In response to Justice Frankfurter's question, "You mean, if we reverse,
it will not entitle every mother to have her child go to a nonsegregated
school in Clarendon County?" Marshall answered, "No, sir," explaining
that:
[t]he school board, I assume, would find some other method of dis-
tributing the children, a recognizable method, by drawing district
lines.... I think whatever district lines they draw, if it can be shown
that those lines are drawn on the basis of race or color, then I think
they would violate the injunction. If the lines are drawn on a natural
basis, without regard to race or color, then I think that nobody would
have any complaint.7 2
With Brown, the Court set the precedent for outlawing state-sanc-
tioned racial segregation in "virtually all aspects of American life,"' 73 not
a standard by which government officials may pursue non-remedial, vol-
untary programs of racial integration.
III. THE UNDERLYING SPIRIT OF BROWN WAS RACIAL NEUTRALITY,
NOT RACIAL INTEGRATION
A. Brown Mandated Strict-Scrutiny Review of all Racial
Line-Drawing by the Government
The role of public education in American society is contentiously
debated, fueling the divisiveness in carrying out Brown's legacy. One
view is that public schools serve a civic mission by providing an early
forum where students may learn to become "better citizens, 74 while
another holds that the primary mission of public education is strictly
academic where student progress is measured by standardized test
scores.7 1 If public schools exist for a civic mission, racial integration
programs stand on a surer footing because school districts may rely on
71. Id. at 36, 47.
72. Id. at 47-48.
73. Robert L. Carter, An Evaluation of Legal Approaches to Equal Educational Opportunity,
in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 93,
99 (Jules B. Gerard ed., 1973).
74. James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131,
143 (2007) ("Indeed, for a long time, the socializing or civic mission of schools was considered by
many to be just as important as the academic mission.").
75. Id. (citing to recent reform programs such as "[b]attles over school funding, charter
schools, vouchers, the No Child Left Behind Act, and access to preschool" as evidence of the
emphasis placed on test scores as guideposts in determining the success of schools).
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their proffered "social benefits" in helping to break down stereotypes
and prevent prejudice among America's students.7 6 On the other hand, if
public schools exist primarily for their academic mission, any social
benefits of integration become wholly irrelevant, and offer no support
for adopting integration programs.
Which approach is consistent with the meaning and spirit of
Brown? Did Brown consider the civic mission of public schools in its
decision to ban racial segregation, or was Brown decided solely on the
basis that race-based segregation of public facilities plainly violates the
Equal Protection Clause? The Justices in Parents Involved were them-
selves sharply torn on this question. Justice Thomas in his concurrence
sides with the academic-mission camp, while the dissenting Justices side
with the civic-mission camp. The Chief Justice avoids siding with either
camp, contending that the sociological or academic effect of diversity is
not a debate in which the Court needs to resolve because the Seattle and
Louisville plans were not narrowly tailored, thus failing strict scrutiny.77
Regardless of their views on the underlying mission of the public
schools, a majority of the Court indisputably applied strict scrutiny
against voluntary integration programs, with equal force as against the
segregationist plans of the Brown era.78
In applying strict scrutiny, the Court recognized that local school
districts may not be given deference when they attempt to use race as a
determinative factor in student assignments.79 Measures voluntarily
undertaken by public school districts to effect racial integration are pre-
76. Id. at 143-44 ("The consensus among social scientists seems to be that integration leads
to some moderate achievement gains for black students and does not harm white students, which
is hardly a ringing endorsement for integration as a method to boost test scores. The defense of
integration has always been on surer footing when one also considers its social benefits.").
77. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2755 (2007)
("The parties and their amici dispute whether racial diversity in schools in fact has a marked
impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits.
The debate is not one we need to resolve, however, because it is clear that the racial classifications
employed by the districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and
social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity.").
78. See Section IV.A. infra; Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2752 ("racial classifications are
simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and
classification.") (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003)). Even the proponents of
voluntary integration recognize that such programs must pass muster under strict scrutiny. See,
e.g., Michael J. Kaufman, Reading, Writing, and Race: The Constitutionality of Educational
Strategies Designed To Teach Racial Literacy, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 707, 715 (2007) ("Strict
scrutiny applies regardless of whether the racial classifications are invidious or benign and 'is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.' ") (quoting
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (2003)).
79. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2766 (noting that deference to local school boards in
making racial classifications "is fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence.
We put the burden on state actors to demonstrate that their race-based policies are justified."); see
also id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that
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sumptively unconstitutional, whether used to advance either a civic or
academic mission.8" Beyond its proper limit of remedying de jure segre-
gation, achieving racial balance in K-12 schools is not a sufficiently
compelling government interest to justify race-based decision making.
As in Parents Involved, Brown prohibited the states from any line-
drawing based on race, whether reasonable or unreasonable. Under
Plessy, courts gave deference to state legislatures to draw lines "equally"
between the races, whereas the Brown Court struck down this practice
altogether and finally "removed the race line in all government sys-
tems."81 Under its newly-adopted color-blind jurisprudence, the Court
did not inquire into the reasonableness of a race-based policy. Rather, all
racial classifications were deemed presumptively unconstitutional.
When it came to matters of race, the Court no longer deferred to legisla-
tive policy-making. And the Court no longer considered whether a racial
classification would achieve beneficial effects such as promoting public
safety or the general welfare. The Court simply took race off the table
altogether. This point was underscored in the next term, when the Court
in Brown H,82 re-emphasized that the ultimate objective in eliminating
de jure segregation is to "achieve a system of determining admission to
the public schools on a nonracial basis."83
The series of per curiam decisions immediately following Brown
exhibit the hard-line approach taken by the Court to uniformly eliminate
the use of racial classifications by government. As Professor Van
Alstyne observes, "virtually every other race-related decision by the
race-based programs are presumptively unconstitutional because the government bears the burden
of justifying its use of individual racial classifications).
80. Social science is largely inconclusive on whether racial integration programs actually
foster "social benefits" in American schools, and results to support either camp have been
criticized as unreliable. See, e.g., id. at 2776 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In reality, it is far from
apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits, much less that integration is
necessary to black achievement.") (noting the amicus briefs that "mirror this divergence of
opinion"); see also Brian N. Lizotte, The Diversity Rationale: Unprovable, Uncompelling, 11
MIcH. J. RACE & L. 625, 629 (2006) ("Social science is grounded in probability, not deductive
logic. Social scientists provide evidence of an effect only by ruling out the possibility that there is
no effect."); Edmund Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 167 (1955) (acknowledging
the reality that social science findings can be so easily revised or repudiated, Prof. Cahn noted that
"since the behavioral sciences are so very young, imprecise, and changeful, their findings have an
uncertain expectancy of life. Today's sanguine asseveration may be cancelled by tomorrow's new
revelation--or new technical fad.").
81. Plessy, 163 U.S. 537, 554 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Kevin H. Smith, The
Jurisprudential Impact of Brown v. Board of Education, 81 N.D. L. REv. 115, 116 (2005) ("In the
years immediately following Brown, the Court's new understanding of the negative psychological
impact of state-mandated segregation was used by federal and state courts to strike down
numerous forms of state-mandated segregation that previously had been permitted under Plessy's
'separate but equal' doctrine.").
82. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
83. Id. at 300-01.
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Supreme Court appeared to convey this same message" that "the Civil
War Amendments altogether 'removed the race line from our govern-
mental systems.'"84 The post-Brown per curiam decisions summarily
dispatched segregation laws including public accommodations in ath-
letic contests,85 municipal golf courses,86 and beaches and bathhouses.87
In each instance where the Court struck down a race-related statute, "the
fulcrum of judicial leverage was an existing governmental race line,
which the particular judicial order sought to remove. The object was
thus to disestablish particular, existing uses of race, not to establish new
ones."88 This was true even in "highly controversial [cases where the]
judicial decree[ ] impaired racially identifiable schools, redrafted attend-
ance lines, or mandated busing."89
This color-blind approach was consistently reaffirmed in the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence between 1955 and 1976.90 In
striking down a statute banning interracial marriage, the Court stated,
"[t]he clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in
the States." 91 In the voting booth, declaring that the state may not desig-
nate candidates' race on ballots, "[t]he vice ... [is] not in the resulting
injury but in the placing of the power of the State behind a racial classi-
fication that induces racial prejudice at the polls." 92 In the context of
public contracting, the Court explained that to grant racial preferences
"would encourage discriminatory hiring to give constitutional protection
to petitioners' efforts to subject the opportunity of getting a job to a
quota system. 93
B. Racial Balancing, Except To Remedy State-Mandated
Segregation, Remains Patently Unconstitutional
Brown's color-blind concept was met with much resistance
throughout the segregated South. All-white schools refused to desegre-
84. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution,
46 U. CHi. L. REv. 775, 783 (1979) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 783 n.24 and cases cited therein.
85. State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959), affg per curiam 168 F. Supp.
149 (E.D. La. 1958).
86. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), vacating per curiam 223 F.2d 93 (5th
Cir. 1955).
87. Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), affg per curiam 220 F.2d 386
(4th Cir. 1955).
88. Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 784 (emphasis in original).
89. See id. at 783-84 & n.25 and cases cited therein.
90. See Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1074 (Cal. 2000).
91. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
92. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).
93. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 463 (1950).
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gate, leading to "more than a decade of defiance and token compli-
ance." 94 Discrimination remained the norm, and intervention was
necessary in order to enforce Brown's ultimate goal of racial neutrality
in governmental systems. Remedial measures actively integrated African
Americans into civil society.95 But these efforts were designed to rem-
edy decades of state-mandated segregation. Just as the Freedmen's
Bureau was enacted to remedy the decades of slavery imposed on Afri-
can Americans, 96 post-Brown remedies sought to undo the harms of Jim
Crow segregation. As such, Brown H's mandate for integration func-
tioned as a narrow remedy in direct response to widespread public resis-
tance to desegregation.
Courts continued to intervene to ensure that desegregation was
being carried out "with all deliberate speed," 97 but these efforts
remained focused on curing vestiges of past de jure segregation. In
1968, the Supreme Court in Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County9 8 added a new chapter to its desegregation jurisprudence when it
charged school districts with an "affirmative duty to take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial dis-
crimination would be eliminated root and branch."9 9 With Green, the
Court embarked on a decade of the most intrusive federal court over-
sight of America's public schools during the 1970s.'° One commentator
observed that "[w]ith the Green decision, the Supreme Court seems to
have gone significantly beyond the letter and spirit of the law elucidated
in Brown."'o' At the same time, however, there is some indication that
the Green Court was compelled to take drastic remedial measures to
counteract inequities in the desegregation programs themselves.' °2
Rather than re-assigning both white and black students to achieve deseg-
regated schools, districts instead had placed the burden of desegregation
squarely on the shoulders of black students.' 3 Black children coura-
geous enough to "break with tradition to obtain a position in a white
94. Ryan, supra note 74, at 152.
95. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (ordering districts to
desegregate with "all deliberate speed," and charged district courts with crafting appropriate
remedies and overseeing the implementation).
96. See Section II.A. supra.
97. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
98. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
99. Id. at 437-38,
100. See Caldas & Bankston, supra note 58, at 231 (explaining that school boards had to
demonstrate that they have desegregated each of the distinct areas of school operations, including
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities.).
101. Id.
102. Carter, supra note 73, at 100.
103. Id.
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school" could do so. 1" This policy was flawed because black children
and their parents were left to carry the burden virtually alone.l15 Recog-
nizing such flaws, the Court in Green instructed the district to devise a
plan that "promises realistically to work now."'116 But although Green
expanded the authority and duties vested in the school districts, with
regard to the way in which they were to desegregate, the Court nonethe-
less emphasized that desegregation plans must promise "immediate pro-
gress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation."' 7
Following Green, the Court issued several pivotal decisions to clar-
ify the extent of school districts' duty to remedy discrimination. In
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,108 while the Court
upheld several desegregation remedies, it also stated that a school dis-
trict's duty under Green is terminated once the school is considered
"unitary."' 10 9 A few years later, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley" 0 struck
down a local government's cross-district busing program implemented
to racially integrate schools within a metropolitan area. Brown H and its
progeny of cases, including Green, Swann, and Milliken, did not grant
the states a broad ability to implement non-remedial racial integration
programs. Rather, these cases were very careful to apply remedies
designed to counteract state-imposed segregation, without extending to
the states the ability to achieve racial balancing as an end in itself. The
controlling principle was that "the scope of the remedy is determined by
the nature and extent of the constitutional violation," namely state-sanc-
tioned segregation." I
In the 1980s and 1990s, affirmative action programs aimed at pro-
moting racial diversity or proportional racial representation were devel-
oped in public contracting, employment, and higher education. In
particular, colleges and universities created race-based programs to
increase minority enrollment. But even as these programs grew in num-
ber, the Court continued to apply strict scrutiny to those plans.1" 2 Simply
having good intentions for categorizing citizens according to their race
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original).
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
109. Id. at 31.
110. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 757 (1974).
111. Id. at 744.
112. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) ("[A]ny person,
of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution
justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest
judicial scrutiny."); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) ("It is by now well established
that 'all racial classifications reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly
scrutinized.' ").
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was not enough to establish a compelling state interest.' 13
In 2003, the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger..4 recognized
another compelling interest: the achievement of a diverse student body
at an elite law school.1 15 But such "diversity" was much broader than
mere "racial diversity.""' 6 In Grutter, the law school's limited consider-
ation of race in admissions was permissible because it considered "a
wide variety of characteristics besides race and ethnicity that contribute
to a diverse student body" such as a student's socioeconomic back-
ground, extracurricular activities, and special interests." 7 The Court
found that, by considering race as one of many factors that would con-
tribute to a broadly diverse student body, the law school was not simply
assuring "some specified percentage of a particular group merely
because of its race or ethnic origin."' 18 While a multifaceted notion of
diversity in an elite professional school may constitute a compelling
interest,' simple racial balancing would not. 2 ' Even in the fact situa-
tion presented by Grutter, the Court reiterated, "outright racial balancing
.. . is patently unconstitutional."' 2 '
C. Parents Involved Goes Back to Brown's Racial Neutrality
Less than five years after Grutter's decision regarding the role of
race in law school admissions, the Supreme Court confronted the same
issues in the context of elementary and secondary schools. Parents
Involved reaffirmed the Court's prohibition against racial balancing, and
shaped the impact of Brown on the future of voluntary racial integration
programs.
After Parents Involved, school officials are prohibited from
113. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226.
114. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
115. Id. at 343-44.
116. Id. at 324-25.
117. Id. at 338-39.
118. Id. at 329 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)).
119. There has been much criticism that the Grutter Court deviated from Brown's strict
scrutiny review of race-based policies. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Originalism and the
Affirmative Action Decisions, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 42 (2004) ("There is [ ] a fundamental
tension between the Court's ruling in Grutter and its decision in Brown. The Court in Brown held
that racial discrimination in public education was prohibited. It did not give any 'deference' to the
state's decision to maintain a segregated school system. Indeed, it did not give any credence to the
state's reasoning in maintaining such a system at all .... This straightforward approach contrasts
sharply with the approach taken by the majority in Grutter."); Gail Heriot, Op-Ed., U.S. Supreme
Court Affirmative Action Rulings; Supreme Court Decision Upholds Principle of Racial
Preferences, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., at GI (June 29, 2003) ("Grutter is a huge loss for those
who favor race neutrality."); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The majority
today refuses to be faithful to the settled principle of strict review [for all racial classifications].").
120. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324-25.
121. Id. at 330.
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assigning individual students on the basis of their race. This is consistent
with Brown's elimination of state-sanctioned segregation. As the Chief
Justice declared for the Parents Involved plurality, "[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis
of race,"' 22 pointing out the Court's "repeated recognition that '[a]t the
heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple
command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as
simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.' "123
Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote in agreement, stating that
"[r]eduction of an individual to an assigned racial identity for differen-
tial treatment is among the most pernicious actions our government can
undertake."'2 4 As Justice Kennedy notes, there is a "presumptive inva-
lidity of a State's use of racial classifications to differentiate its treat-
ment of individuals."1
25
Without any evidence of past or existing de jure segregation, racial
balancing per se is not a compelling governmental interest. The Court
has always insisted upon "some showing of prior discrimination by the
governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classi-
fications in order to remedy such discrimination."'' 26 In Parents
Involved, the Chief Justice noted that "the harm being remedied by
mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segrega-
tion, and that 'the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the
schools, without more.' ",127 As Justice Thomas further explained, "racial
imbalance without intentional state action to separate the races does not
amount to segregation. To raise the specter of resegregation to defend
these [school districts'] programs is to ignore the meaning of the word
and the nature of the cases before us. 1 28 There was no "resegregation"
going on in the Seattle and Jefferson County school districts, merely
racial imbalances resulting from voluntary housing patterns, which are
strictly outside the province of school districts to remedy through race-
based means. 1
29
The de-jure/de-facto distinction delimits the powers of the judiciary
in the fashioning of race-based remedies, and "serves as a limit on the
exercise of a power that reaches to the very verge of constitutional
122. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007).
123. Id. at 2757 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
124. Id. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125. Id. at 2794.
126. Id. at 2795 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)).
127. Id. at 2752 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n.14 (1977)).
128. Id. at 2769-70 (Thomas, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 2769.
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authority."13 Justice Kennedy cautioned that this distinction "ought not
to be altogether disregarded, however, when we come to that most sensi-
tive of all racial issues, an attempt by the government to treat whole
classes of persons differently based on the government's systematic
classification of each individual by race."'' 3 1 Paralleling Brown, the Par-
ents Involved Court held that a school district may not consider an indi-
vidual student's race in assigning that student to a particular school.
IV. THE ROLE OF PARENTS INVOLVED IN REALIZING
AMERICA'S PROMISE OF EQUALITY
A. Parents Involved Determined that There is No "Benign-Use"
Exception to the Equal Protection Clause
The Parents Involved Court was faced with the question of whether
the "benign" or good faith intent behind a race-conscious policy should
free that governmental program from the usually fatal application of
strict scrutiny. In other words, because a school's race-based assign-
ments are no longer perniciously motivated to maintain a racial caste
system against one particular racial minority group, but rather designed
to "integrate" the races, should the courts allow more deference to local
schools to carry out these policies? The Court answered with a decisive
"no," thereby realigning itself to Brown's ultimate goal of eliminating
racial lines in all governmental systems.
One of Brown's groundbreaking impacts on American society is
that it began the dismantling of a state-sanctioned system of racial hier-
archy in which African Americans were considered second-class citi-
zens.1 32 Brown recognized that state-mandated racial segregation
imposes a stigmatic harm on black schoolchildren, which the Court
defined as "a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone."' 33 This categorical observation, however, has been stretched
beyond its original intent of outlawing state-sanctioned racial segrega-
tion. "'34 Federal courts at every level have analogized this stigma to a
wide array of state actions that they perceive as creating a sense of infer-
iority, including affirmative action programs in upper-level education
and contracting.' 35 Parents Involved was no exception, as the Justices
130. Id. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
131. Id.
132. Smith, supra note 21, at 298.
133. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
134. Smith, supra note 21, at 299.
135. Smith, supra note 81, at 120-23 (Other cases in which courts have recognized a
psychological stigmatic harm as a result of state programs regarding: "law school affirmative
action admissions programs, denial of admission of an all-black high school to a state athletic
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continued to spar on the relevance, impact, and the very definition of
Brown's stigmatic harm as it applies to voluntary integration in K-12
public schools.
The dissenting Justices, citing various legal scholars and commen-
tators, presented a vigorous defense of voluntary integration. 36 They
contended that today's school officials are acting in good faith with a
pure motive to bring the races together rather than to keep the races
apart as was the case in Brown.137 According to their view, although the
districts' voluntary integration programs were influenced by race, "[n]ot
every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable," and "exclu-
sive and inclusive" uses of race should not be treated the same.' 38 The
dissenting Justices contended that "[c]ontext matters when reviewing
race-based governmental action."'' 39 They further argued that the Seattle
and Louisville plans "differ dramatically" from those in which "race-
conscious limits stigmatize or exclude; the limits at issue [here] do not
pit the races against each other or otherwise significantly exacerbate
racial tensions" as they did in Brown.4 ' Therefore, they contend that
since the school districts' present day race-conscious programs are not
motivated by the ill intent to further stigmatic harms through the mainte-
nance of a racial caste system, these programs should be upheld. "The
context here is one of racial limits that seek, not to keep the races apart,
but to bring them together," and as such, the Court should treat these
inclusive programs with more deference and permissibility. 4 '
In sharp contrast, Justice Thomas found that "as a general rule, all
race-based government decisionmaking-regardless of context-is
unconstitutional."' 42 In this, Justice Thomas has remained steadfast to
his stringent views of dismantling the role of race in public education.' 43
association, suspension from school of a student with behavioral and emotional problems,
segregation from the general student body of students with AIDS, the constitutionality of a city-
mandated road closure at the border between a white neighborhood and a black neighborhood,
treatment of a trust intended to benefit only white people, the constitutionality of a rule prohibiting
co-educational teams in high school contact sports, treatment of minority principals when schools
close as a result of a plan to end desegregation, racial discrimination as a form of unfair labor
practice, employment discrimination, housing discrimination, denial of supplemental social
security income benefits to patients of public mental hospitals, treatment of children benefiting
from aid to families with dependent children, and a state statute criminalizing miscegenation.")
(internal citations omitted).
136. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2815 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2800-37
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2800.
138. Id. at 2817 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-327 (2003)).
139. Id. at 2818 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2770-71 (Thomas, J., concurring).
143. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349-51 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
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"The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only because
those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate
motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on
racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or
benefits, it demeans us all."'" He adamantly contended that what the
dissenters call "benign" racial integration is not actually benign after
all.' 4 5 Justice Thomas defines racial stigma more broadly to include the
effects of any use of race by the government in granting or denying
public benefits. Reasserting his concurrence in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, Justice Thomas reminded the dissenters, "every time the
government uses racial criteria to 'bring the races together' someone
gets excluded, and the person excluded suffers an injury solely because
of his or her race."' 146 Under this view, the simple fact that the govern-
ment is using race is offensive, as it causes stigmatic harms on either one
racial group or another, regardless of the government's purported "pure
motives." 1
47
1. STIGMATIC HARMS ARE INHERENTLY SUBJECTIVE AND MAY NOT
GUIDE THE COURT'S EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE
As the foregoing colloquy among the Parents Involved Justices
demonstrates, the concept of "stigmatic harm" is inherently subjective
and indeterminate, and thus cannot serve as the basis of determining the
legitimacy of a governmental action. What one would consider a stigma
does not ring true for another, 148 and stigmatic harms may change
depending on popular perceptions of societal acceptance. 4 9 This practi-
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515
U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
144. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2770 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
145. Id. at 2775 (Thomas, J., concurring).
146. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)) (internal citations
omitted).
147. Id. at 2770 (Thomas, J., concurring).
148. Lauren E. Winters, Colorblind Context: Redefining Race-Conscious Policies in Primary
and Secondary Education, 86 OR. L. REv. 679, 693 (2007) (While districts engaged in racial
integration to achieve "diversity benefits" in their schools, "[m]any Americans began to believe
that affirmative action meant preferential treatment for racial and ethnic minorities who were less
qualified than their white counterparts.").
149. Today's debates regarding race-relations in America reflect a variety of differing
viewpoints on which groups actually "benefit" from affirmative action policies. The "Bill Cosby
position" is "that blacks not rest on victimhood but take 'full responsibility for [their] lives.'"
Barack Obama has publicly rejected Rev. Jeremiah Wright's racial comments as "wrong" and
"divisive." At the same time, "[miost working- and middle-class [white] Americans don't feel
privileged by race." "Segments have entrenched anger, too-over forced busing, welfare, and
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cal difficulty of assessing the stigmatic impact of race-based policies on
a racially diverse society is directly illustrated by the Court's own divi-
siveness on the issue.
The dissenting Justices cite to a series of race-based programs that
were struck down by the Court because they were deemed to impose a
"racial stigma" upon members of one racial group. 150 In fact, Judge
Kozinski, concurring in the Ninth Circuit's decision upholding Seattle's
racial integration programs, noted that although the denial of a student's
application to attend the school of his choice "may be disappointing, [ ]
it carries no racial stigma and says nothing at all about that individual's
aptitude or ability.""15 He further colorfully noted that a racial integra-
tion program designed by the local community is "a plan that gives the
American melting pot a healthy stir without benefiting or burdening any
particular group. '
Taking a step back to view the larger ramifications of race-based
governmental decisionmaking, however, yields a much clearer picture.
The very fact that a student is denied the school of his choice based on
his race results in racial stigma. As Judge Kozinski correctly observed,
the school's decision to exclude the student from admission said "noth-
ing at all about that individual's aptitude or ability." Rather, it says eve-
rything about the student's race-specifically, that he was not of the
race his preferred school wanted or valued. Racial stigma not only
occurs when the government intends to subjugate one race below
another; it occurs as a natural byproduct of any racial line drawing by
the government. As the Parents Involved Court explained, "[o]ne of the
principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it
demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry
instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities." '153
Nearly thirty years ago, Professor Van Alstyne perceptively noted
the overall danger of allowing the government to use race in its decision-
racial preferences." Editorial, Not so Black and White, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 28,
2008, at 8, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0320/p08s01-comv.html (last visited
February 7, 2009).
150. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2818-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005)).
151. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1194 (9th Cir.
2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring), rev'd 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
152. Id. at 1196.
153. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767 (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517
(2000)).
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making. He observed that "[i]n the past, the consequences of admitting
race-based laws as a proper constitutional foundation for regulating and
allocating have been overwhelmingly dismal."'154 He further explained,
"[r]ace-based laws have so generally tended to yield by-products and
side effects so vastly more divisive and wretched than the benefits that
were supposed to be forthcoming, moreover, that a Court originally not
predisposed to veto racial experiments subsequently reversed itself
[Brown's overturning of Plessy]-despite the popular anger and resent-
ment that were certain to follow.'
' 55
Brown would never countenance subjecting constitutional liberties
to the whim of indeterminate and subjective notions of stigmatic harms.
As the Court noted in Adarand,156 "[a] free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality, should tolerate no retreat from the
principle that government may treat people differently because of their
race only for the most compelling reasons." 157
Deference to governmental officials to enact race-based policies is
unwarranted under strict scrutiny review, regardless of whether a court
believes those policies may create subjective perceptions of "stigma."
' 158
The Parents Involved Court agreed, affirming the application of
nondeferential strict scrutiny on all governmental racial classifications,
whatever the underlying motive. 159 As Justice Thomas explained,
"[p]urportedly benign race-based decisionmaking suffers the same con-
stitutional infirmity as invidious race-based decisionmaking"-and both
are subject to the highest level of strict scrutiny. 160 As one commentator
has pointed out, "[t]o squeeze human beings of varying talents, interests,
and backgrounds into an undifferentiated category of race is to submerge
what should matter most about us under what should matter least."'
16 1
This is the fundamental reason that any racial line-drawing by govern-
ment must be subjected to strict scrutiny, irrespective of the wide array
154. Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 778.
155. Id.
156. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
157. Id. at 227 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
158. See Robert Carter & Thurgood Marshall, The Meaning and Significance of the Supreme
Court Decree (1955), reprinted in THURGOOD MARSHALL: His SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS,
OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 157, 160 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001) (praising Brown for its
"important shifting" of the burden of proof onto government).
159. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2751-52
(2007) ("It is well established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the
basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.") (citing
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326
(2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
160. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2774 (Thomas, J., concurring).
161. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Seattle and Louisville School Cases: There Is No Other Way,
121 HARV. L. REV. 158, 163-64 (2007).
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of intended or unintended "stigmatic harms" that may result from such
policies.
2. RACE-BASED POLICIES DESIGNED TO PREVENT STIGMATIC
HARMS ARE NOT BENIGN USES OF RACE
Race-based governmental decisionmaking is inherently prejudicial,
inevitably embodying societal stereotypes and biases. Racial stereotypes
and biases are offensive when acted upon by private individuals, but
they are especially offensive and dangerous when employed by the gov-
ernment.1 62 The Jim Crow era was an especially heinous chapter of
American history because our government itself institutionalized and
perpetuated private racial prejudices. "The whole sad saga of the early
African American experience teaches that racial decisions by the state
remain unique in their capacity to demean." '163 Even in the aftermath of
Jim Crow, the Supreme Court felt a need to caution the government
about yielding to popularly held racial attitudes when it warned that
"[p]ublic officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a
constitutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private racial
prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply held."' 6 4 In
eliminating school segregation, Brown endorsed the concept of individ-
ual autonomy free from state-imposed racial categories.
The constitutional presumption against governmental racial line-
drawing stands as firmly today as it did in Brown, regardless of a pur-
ported "benign" purpose by the government. In the 1984 case of Pal-
more v. Sidoti,65 the Court reversed a lower court's decision granting
child custody to the father on the basis that the child's Caucasian mother
was remarried to an African American man, and that it would not be in
the "best interests of the child" to be raised in a home with multiracial
parents. 166 Indeed, the reality at that time was that widely held private
prejudices might in fact have adversely affected the child's interests, and
the lower court's decision was well-intended in trying to protect the
162. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("Classifying persons according to their
race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns; the race, not the
person, dictates the category." (citing Pers. Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272
(1979))); Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507 ("[R]acial classifications 'threaten to stigmatize individuals by
reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility' .... By perpetuating the
notion that race matters most, racial segregation of inmates 'may exacerbate the very patterns of
[violence that it is] said to counteract.' ") (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643-48 (1993)).
163. Wilkinson, supra note 161, at 163.
164. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433 (1984) (quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 260-61
(1971) (White, J., dissenting)).
165. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
166. Id. at 430-31.
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child from the psychological harms that could result from these
prejudices. Addressing this concern in specific terms, the Court noted
[i]t would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices
do not exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices have been
eliminated. There is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a
different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not
present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or
ethnic origin. 
167
In that regard, the lower court could be said to have acted reasona-
bly and, according to the judicial record, was genuinely motivated by the
"benign" purpose of safeguarding the best interests of the child. None-
theless, the Supreme Court unequivocally declared, "[t]he Constitution
cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly
or indirectly, give them effect."' 168 Private racial prejudice cannot justify
state-mandated racial classifications. State-sanctioned racial line-draw-
ing is dangerous and inherently prejudicial, regardless of whatever
benign or well-intended motives are underlying them. 1
69
As demonstrated by the variety of amicus briefs filed on behalf of
both sides in Parents Involved, 7' the psychological, emotional, and
mental harms that result when government engages in racial line -draw-
ing are numerous and often unintended by policymakers. Even when
race-conscious policies intend to help all groups rather than harm any-
one in particular, they invariably leave damaging race-related side
effects. '7
167. Id. at 433.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502 (2005) (The Court applied strict
scrutiny to a state policy of racially segregating prison inmates, even though its purpose was to
prevent violence caused by racial gangs).
170. There were a total of sixty amicus briefs filed in Parents Involved, including race-based
organizations such as the Asian American Legal Foundation, Asian American Justice Center,
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Black Women Lawyers' Association of
Chicago, Latino Organizations, and NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Supreme Court Docket No. 05-
908, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/05-908.htm (last visited Feb. 8 2009).
171. See, e.g., Brief of the Asian American Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 16, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738
(2007) (Nos. 05-908 and 05-915) ("While mandated racial balancing in San Francisco's schools
did not produce discemable benefits, it caused obvious harm. . . . 'Many Chinese American
children have internalized their anger and pain, confused about why they are treated differently
from their non-Chinese friends."' (quoting Group Preferences and the Law: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of
Lee Cheng, Secretary of the Asian American Legal Foundation))); Brief of Various School
Children from Lynn, Massachusetts, Who Are Parties in Comfort v. Lynn School Committee as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908 and 05-915) ("Using race-based student assignments
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B. Justice Kennedy's Race-Neutral Alternatives Must Still Pass
Muster Under the Court's Equal Protection Clause Jurisprudence
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved provided the
fifth vote necessary to strike down the school districts' assignment
plans, on the grounds that they were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
satisfy strict scrutiny. Rather than taking the strong color-blind stance
held by the plurality, however, Justice Kennedy left the door ajar for
race-consciousness to creep into public school assignments under lim-
ited circumstances. Justice Kennedy reasoned that the assignment plans
before the Court failed strict scrutiny for two reasons: (1) the districts
did not first consider "facially race-neutral means" and (2) they did not
undergo a "more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and
student characteristics that might include race as a component."' 7 2 In
Justice Kennedy's view, either of these two approaches could have made
the plans sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny.
Justice Kennedy's second approach "would be informed by Grut-
ter, though of course the criteria relevant to student placement would
differ based on the age of the students, the needs of the parents, and the
role of the schools."' 73 Thus, while agreeing with the plurality that
school districts may not differentiate individual students based on race
when drawing attendance zones, Justice Kennedy did not foreclose the
use of generalized, race-conscious methods. 1 74 According to the Justice,
this means that if race-conscious measures are to be used at all, then they
must be used "without treating each student in different fashion solely





Justice Kennedy is more descriptive of his first approach and pro-
vides guidelines of race-neutral measures that districts may employ in
order to prevent racial isolation in their schools. These include "strategic
site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources
for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fash-
ion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by
race." 176 He stresses that in implementing these measures, the districts
must not assign "to each student a personal designation according to a
to achieve diversity based purely on race assumes that a child will contribute in a certain way to
the classroom, without any examination of the individual child.").
172. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2793 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2792.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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crude system of individual racial classifications."'' 77 As support for the
constitutionality of these race-neutral alternatives, Justice Kennedy cites
to the Court's precedent with regard to gerrymandering and the state's
ability to draw electoral boundaries. 78 He reasons that these facially
neutral measures should be employed "with candor and with confi-
dence" without constitutional problems. 1
79
Some proponents of voluntary integration may have overstated the
constitutional permissibility of Justice Kennedy's facially race-neutral
alternatives. 180 As Justice Kennedy points out, facially neutral measures
require "a more searching inquiry" before strict scrutiny applies, but
courts are nonetheless ultimately bound by the most exacting level of
judicial review.' 8 ' If facially neutral measures are being used simply as a
pretext for racial discrimination by the state, then strict scrutiny applies
with equal force.' 82 Notably, in Columbus Board of Education v.
Penick,'83 the Court struck down a school district's race-neutral policy
of using "optional attendance zones, discontiguous attendance areas, and
boundary changes; and the selection of sites for new school construc-
tion" because they were "intentionally segregative" and "had the fore-
seeable and anticipated effect of maintaining the racial separation of the
schools." 1
84
While racially disproportionate effects of a facially race-neutral
policy can be shown with empirical data, proving that the purpose
behind the policy was actually a "pretext for racial discrimination" is
more difficult. For example, in the context of allegedly racially-moti-
vated, but factually race-neutral, decisions by a zoning board, the Court
has required a showing that the challenged actions would not have
occurred in the absence of a racially discriminatory purpose-i.e., dis-
criminatory motivation must not only be established, but shown to be
177. Id.
178. See id. ("[s]trict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed with
consciousness of race . . . . Electoral district lines are 'facially race neutral' so a more searching
inquiry is necessary before strict scrutiny can be found applicable in redistricting cases than in
cases of 'classifications based explicitly on race."' (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958
(1996))).
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Glass Half Full: Envisioning the Future of Race
Preference Policies, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRV. AM. L. 385, 419 (2008) (Justice Kennedy's "clear
formulation of the appropriate instances in which courts may find that a state agency has met its
burden of showing a compelling governmental interest provides future courts with the ability to
uphold race-preference challenges beyond the context of higher education."); see also Kaufman,
supra note 78, at 734-40 (identifying the race-neutral alternatives in achieving racial diversity
under Grutter).
181. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (quoting Bush, 517 U.S. at 958).
182. See, e.g., id.; Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
183. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
184. Id. at 461-62.
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the "but-for" cause of the board's actions."'
' 85
In cases involving gerrymandering of voter districts, the Court has
been somewhat more stringent in its review of facially neutral policies
affecting racial balancing. In these cases, for a constitutional challenge
to succeed, racially discriminatory intent need not be the "but-for" cause
of the creation of the boundaries in question, but must be shown to be
the authorities' "predominant motivation"- i.e., in order for the district
boundaries to be invalidated, any non-racial motivations must be shown
to have been subordinate to racial ones.'86 If Justice Kennedy's analogy
of school district line-drawing with voter district line-drawing is taken as
the relevant standard, school districts therefore may not employ facially
race-neutral measures when they are predominately motivated by racial
balancing.'
81
Predictably, courts will need to engage in their own line-drawing in
determining which race-neutral alternatives are predominately racially
motivated, and which are not. To be sure, Justice Kennedy's opinion
invites further litigation regarding the manner and extent to which
school districts may implement race-conscious policies to achieve non-
remedial integration in their schools.
V. CONCLUSION: REALIZING BROWN'S SPIRIT OF RACIAL
NEUTRALITY BEYOND PARENTS INVOLVED
"To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is incon-
sistent with the dignity of individuals in our society."'
188
Parents Involved provides increased hope for realizing Brown's
ultimate goal of racial neutrality in our public school system. Although
the severely divided opinion leaves much room for further interpretation,
the majority of the Court in Parents Involved made three points clear:
voluntary integration plans, like any governmental racial classifications,
are subject to strict scrutiny, 8 9 school districts may not classify individ-
185. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977).
186. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 958 ("Strict scrutiny applies where 'redistricting legislation . . . is
so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the
races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles,' or where 'race
for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and
controlling rationale in drawing its district lines,' and 'the legislature subordinated traditional
race-neutral districting principles ... to racial considerations.' ") (internal citations omitted).
187. See also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 512 (2005) ("[I]n the redistricting context,
despite the traditional deference given to States when they design their electoral districts, we have
subjected redistricting plans to strict scrutiny when States draw district lines based predominantly
on race.").
188. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2797 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
189. See Section III.A. supra.
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ual students according to state-defined racial groups, 190 and race-neutral
alternatives are still subject to the strictures of the Court's equal protec-
tion jurisprudence.' 9'
In present-day America, racial lines are continuously blurring and
diversity has become a multifaceted concept composed of ethnic, social,
and economic factors. Moreover, the racial and ethnic diversity of
America is drastically evolving to encompass a multiplicity of groups
and sub-groups of different cultures, traditions, and ethnicities. With
continuing immigration and globalization, Americans may no longer be
identified by government-imposed labels of identity. Second-generation
immigrant Americans identify themselves differently than their first-
generation counterparts, just as those born in the "millennia generation"
exhibit different characteristics and values than those in the "baby-
boomer generation." Americans today are living in a drastically different
society, racially and culturally, than in the time of the dual black-or-
white system of segregation, yet Brown's spirit of racial neutrality is all
the more compelling today. To allow the government to categorize
American citizens into arbitrarily defined racial groups for purposes of
differential treatment would be an insult to the spirit of Brown and a
repudiation of our society's progress towards true diversity.
190. See Section IV.A. supra.
191. See Section IV.B. supra.
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